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Timely Cert to CA 2 
(Mansfield; 
Friendly, ~ -~ ~ 
concurring; 
Meskill, ~ ~ 
dissenting) -~ , n /-. -, 7 
Feoeral/Criminal • 
56-~~ 
Petr challenges his conviction of ~~ 
conspiracy to engage in securities fraud, fraud in a bank ~- ~ -~ 
--~. 
loan application, mail fraud, and wire fraud on grounds 
that a pledge of stock as collateral for a loan is not a - ............... ~ ....... ~ 
"sale" of a security within the meaning of the antifraud -
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933; that•the government 
was required under Brady v. ~aryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), t6 
~ ~u-vu ~~ ~~ ftA..oS-t;" "- W~;." ~. ~T k #Jc/ 
~ Act/urn v, s-EC
1 
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disclose the criminal record of a ~o~conspirator who did 
not testify at petr's trial; and that the DC improperly 
admitted into evidence certain interview notes contrary to 
Fed. R. Evid. 80l(d)(l)(B). 
2. FACTS & DECISIONS BELOW: Beginning in October 
1972, petr and two other officers of Tri-State Energy, Inc. 
sought to obtain loans for Tri-State, which was a financially 
failing company, from Bankers Trust Co. Petr knew Ludwig, 
the officer at Bankers Trust in charge of corporate loans, and 
met with him. Ludwig stated that a loan was impossible because 
Tri-State could not adequately document i.ts assets or earnings 
potential. Petr responded: "If you can see your way clear to 
help us, we will take care of you." 
To assure Ludw.ig and other bank officers about Tri-State's 
financial condition, petr assisted in the preparation of a finan-
........... -------
cial statement that was false and misleading. It listed a $7.5 
million account receivable as Tri-State's principal asset, and a 
copy of the contract reflecting this receivable was attached to 
the statement. But no such receivable in fact existed, and the 
signature on the contract was forged. At petr's suggestion this 
"asset" was balanced on the statement by a fictitious tax lia-
bility. As originally prepared, the statement also listed $200,000 
in cash on hand, attributable to two undeposited and uncashed per-
sonal checks, and $64,000 in bank accounts. Noting that these 
items would look suspicious, petr urged their eonsolidation and 
their listing as cash on hand with no explanation. The statement 
( 
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also indicated that Tri-State owned coal worth $180,000, 
when in fact it owned far less. Upon receiving this false 
information, the bank approved an initial loan of $50,000. 
Petr and two other Tri-State officers agreed then 
to pay Ludwig the promised bribe. They gave $1,500 in cash 
to Ludwig, and followed that with payments of . an additional 
$2,500 to Ludwig and of $1,000 to a second cooperative bank 
official. 
During the next six weeks Tri-State borrowed an 
additional $425,000 from the bank. Petr engaged in a number 
of fraudulent acts to convince the bank tbat the loan was 
secure and to persuade it not to call the loan. For example, 
petr gave a bank officer a written projection of Tri-State's 
revenues that indicated that Tri-State would receive $540,000 
in gross income. The projection, however, was based in sub-
stantial part on nonexistent business contracts. 
Petr also concealed Tri-State's dismal financial position 
by pledging nearly worthless stock as collateral for the loans. 
Between October 1972 and January 1973, Tri-State pledged the 
stock of several companies as collateral and represented that 
those securities were owned by Tri-State and were freely market-
able. But Tri-State did not own the stock; the company "rented" 
it. The shares were not freely tradeable and had no current mar-
ket. To lend to the stock the appearance of marketability, petr 
engaged in apparent purchase and sale transactrons so that the 







over-the-counter brokerage firm. Tri-State also showed a 
bank officer a newspaper clipping indicating that the stock 
was trading for about $20 per share; in fact, the clipping 
was not a stock quotation but an ·advertisement · arranged by 
Tri-State. When the lessor of this stock later found out 
that it had been pledged, he informed the bank officer that 
Tri-State did not own it and that the stock was restricted. 
The sands then began to shift beneath petr's financial 
castle. Tri-State was unable to repay the loans as they ma-
tured. The bank eventually was able to recover only $2,500 of 
the $4 7 5, 000 (plus interest and expenses) that Tri-State was 
obligated to repay. Petr and four others were named in a three-
count indictment handed down on January 27, 1978. Count One 
~
charged all five wit.h conspiracy to violate a federal statute 
prohibiting the making of false statements in connection with a 
loan application, a loan renewal, deferral of action on a loan, 
or substitution of security for a loan, as well as federal stat-
utes relating to mail fraud, wire fraud, and securities fraud. 
Count Two charged petr and three of the others with a substantive 
violation of the false statement statute, and ~charged 
petr and three of the others with a substantive violation of the 
securities fraud statute. Prior to trial the Government moved 
for a severance of petr's trial, and the trial judge (Motley, J.) 
granted the motion. After a fifteen-day jury trial, petr was 
found guilty on Count One, but was acquitted on Count Three. No 
verdict was reached on Count Two, so the Government moved to have 
( 
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Count Two dismissed, and this motion was granted. Petr was 
sentenced to three years in prison. A panel of theCA 2, with 
Judge Meskill dissenting, affirmed. 
Most of Judge Mansfield's majo~ity opinion, all of 
Judge Friendly's concurrence, and all of Judge Meskill's dissent 
deal with an evidentiary issue raised by petr: that the DC im-
.. ~ ---....... ,.,.. 
properly admitted into evidence several pages of notes as prior 
consistent statements of an agent who testified on behalf of the 
government. Petr was interviewed on several occasions by govern-
ment agents before the indictment was returned. Several of the 
agents took notes. Agent Cox, who testified at trial, did not 
personally take notes, but he was present at the interviews, 
examined the notes of other agents, and testified that the notes 
accurately reflected what had been said. Cox used the notes to 
refresh his memory during direct. Petr's counsel used the notes 
extensively during cross-examination of Cox, and even read from 
them repeatedly before they were admitted into evidence. Petr's 
counsel presumably intended to create the impr~ssion that Cox's 
testimony differed from the notes. On redirect the government 
offered four excerpts from the notes to show that the agent's 
testimony was consistent with them. Petr argued before the CA 2 
that this evidence should not have been admitted because it did 
not satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Evid. 80l(d)(l)(B), which, 
as interpreted in United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233-234 
(CA 2 1978), requires that prior statements must be consistent with 
the witness's in-court testimony, must be offered to rebut an 
( 
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express or implied charge of recent fabrication, and must 
be made before a motive to fabricate arose. Judge Mansfield 
noted that no objection was made at trial to the receipt of 
one of the exhibits and that petr's counsel had · read the ob-
jectionable portion of another exhibit to the jury before the 
government offered it. Moreover, there was reason under the 
doctrine of completeness, Fed. R. Evid. 106, ~o place addi-
tional portions of the notes before the jury. The majority 
opinion also held that, even if the admission of the excerpts 
were treated as error, the error would be harmless. The in-
troduction of the notes, in the majority '.s view, added little to 
what the jury already knew. Judge Friendly concurred in Judge 
Mansfield's opinion, but also argued that a less exacting 
standard for admissibility ought to be used when prior state-
ments are employed merely to bolster a witness's credibility. 
In dissent, Judge Meskill argued that petr's trial counsel's ob-
jections were sufficient to preserve all the evidentiary chal-
lenges on appeal, that Quinto and United States v. Check, 582 F.2d 
668 (CA 2 1978), required the exclusion of the excerpts even as 
rehabilitative evidence, and that any error was not harmless be-
cause it could not be said that "the error did not influence the 
jury or had but very slight effect ..•• " Quinto, supra, at 235. 
Petr raised other issues before the CA 2 that either were 
not discussed by the court of appeals or are immaterial to this 
Court's review of the petition. 
- 7 -
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr renews his argument that 
Rule 80l(d)(l)(B) ought to have precluded admission of the 
excerpts. The Rule reads: 
·~ statement is not hears?y if [t]h~ 
declarant testifies at the trial or 
hearing ·and is subject to cross-ex-
amination concerning the statement, 
and the statement is .•• consistent 
with his testimony and is offered to 
rebut an express or implied charge 
against him of recent fabrication or 
improper influence or motive .••• " 
Petr attacks Judge Friendly's distinction between use of 
such statements as affirmative evidence and their use for 
rehabilitation. The former use is governed by the Rule, 
according to Judge Friendly's concurrence, but the latter is 
not. Petr's analysis leaves unscathed, however, the arguments 
of Judge Mansfield's .majority opinion. 
In response the SG relies primarily on the majority 
opinion: no objection to one exhibit; petr's counsel had 
already read another into the record; Fed. R. Evid. 106; and 
harmless error. The SG also notes that Judge Friendly's in-
teresting theoretical distinction between uses of prior 
statements, though the focus of petr's analysis, is not the 
law of this case or of theCA 2. 
Petr also contends that the prosecution committed a 
Brady violation by not disclosing the criminal record of one 
Starns, who had written the two uncashed and undeposited 
personal checks falsely listed as "cash on han·d" in the fi-
nancial statement given to the bank. Starns did not testify 
-,......., .. ' . / 
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at petr's trial, but he did testify' at the subsequent trials 
of petr's co-indictees, where he stated that he had been ar-
rested for passing bad checks in 1963, though he was not 
convicted on that charge and served no time, and that he had 
again been arrested for passing a bad check in 1973 and was 
later convicted for uttering forged securities. A gover.nment 
witness, agent Cox, testified that petr told him in 1972 (at 
the time Starns' bad checks for Tri-State were extant) that he 
(petr) knew Starns had previously been convicted and incarcer-
ated for passing bad checks .. Petr points out that Starns was 
not convicted and incarcerated until 1973 and 1974 and that if 
this were known at trial it would have undercut the agent's 
assertion. Because the agent's testimony undermined petr's 
testimony of his innocence, the Government was obligated under 
Brady to come forward with the information. 
The SG responds that the Brady argument was not raised 
in the DC and thus was not properly raised before theCA 2, 
which did not discuss it. This Court need not address the 
question. At any event, petr's argument is meritless. Starns 
was not a witness for the government, and his ·criminal record 
could have had no impeachment value. · Further, evidence of 
Starns' record would have buttressed the government's case 
rather than detracted from it. In no way, moreover, could petr 
have used the knowledge of Starns' full record for exculpatory 
purposes. Petr still knew that the checks listed as "cash on 




properly reported as "cash" items. ' Because of many other 
misrepresentations as well, the details of Starns' criminal 
record could not have created a reasonable doubt as to petr's 
guilt. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 113-114 (1976). 
Finally, petr contends that a pledge of securities 
does not come within the proscription of fraud "in the offer 
or sale of any securities" found in § 17 (a) of the Securities 
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77q(a). Petr moved at the pre-trial 
stage and at the conclusion of the government's case to strike --from Count One the characterization of a pledge of stock as an 
offer or sale of securities, but the DC twice denied the motion 
and instructed the jury as follows: "I charge you as a matter 
of law that the pledge of securities with the bank is an offer 
and sale for purpose .of this Act." Petr challenged this ruling 
before theCA 2, and the government's brief in the court of ap-
peals supported the ruling. But the CA 2 did not bother to 
discuss the issue in its opinion. Petr asserts a conflict on 
this issue between theCA 2 and theCA 6, on the one hand, see 
the present case; United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 466-
467 (CA 2), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976); Mansbach v. 
Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017 (CA 6 1979), and theCA 5 
and CA 7, on the other, see National Bank of Commerce v. All 
American Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295, 1298-1300 (CA 5 1978); 
Lincoln National Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1040-1044 (CA 7 
1979). Indeed, three years ago this Court granted certiorari 
to resolve the related question, also subject to a split among 
- 10 -
the circuits, whether a pledge of stock is a sale of a security 
under§ lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 14 U.S.C. 
78j(b), but dismissed the petition as improvidently granted aft~ 
resps during oral argument changed tbe theory upon which they 
sought affirmation. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 431 U.S. 928 
(1977); 435 U.S. 381 (1978). To underscore the relatedness of 
the two questions, petr points out that theCA 2 in Mallis relied 
on Gentile as precedent. 568 F.2d, at 829. Petr believes that 
the view of the CA 5 and CA 7 is more consonant with the purpose 
of the Securities Acts and with the principles announced in Blue 
I . . 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 u.s .. 723 (1975). Relatedly, 
petr argues that he had no warning of the relevance of the § 17(a) 
to his case because Gentile had not yet been decided at the time 
of petr's alleged criminal activity. 
I 
In response the SG con~ exi~tence of the conflict l 
and does not oppose granting the petition o~ this question. A - ~ - ----- ._,......-., _,_.... . 
pledge falls within the definition of "sale" contained in § 2 (3) 
of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. 77b(3), which includes "every contract 
~~Jh.~  f 1 d. . . f . . . . ~ o sa e or 1spos1t1on o a secur1ty or 1nter~st 1n a secur1ty, 
J ~ for yal~." This outcome is in agreement with the congressional 
intent underlying the anti-fraud provisions, for those sections 
were intended to apply when any person is deceived into parting 
with money in exchange for an interest in a security. 
4. DISCUSSION: Petr does not challenge the analysis . 
of Judge Mansfield's majority opinion on the admissibility of the 




error determination and the other findings of that opinion 
that undercut his argument based on Rule 80l(d)(l)(B). 
Judge Friendly's analysis in concurrence is not at issue, 
and review is unwarranted. 
Petr's Brady contention is fact-bound and does not 
merit review. 
Review appears to be warranted on the securities 
law point. A conflict indeed exists, and this Court in Mallis 
evinced an interest in clarifying this area of the law. I 
recommend granting this petition and limiting review to the 
first question presented: "Hhether a pledge of stock to a bank 
as collateral for a bank loan is an 'offer or sale' of a security 
under 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)?" 
There is a response. 
3/27/80 
ME 
Kalis Opinion in 
Petition 
April 11, 1980 
Court ............. ~ ... . Voted on ....... .......... , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assign~d .......... ... ..... , 19 . . . No. 79-101: 








ABSENT NOT VOTING 
FOR 
G / D N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D 
Burger, Ch. J . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... /. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
Brennan, J.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ .......... . .... . . 
Stewart, J ..................... ~. . . . . ............... . 
White, J ...................... V ..... ................ . 
Marshall, J .................... ~ .................... . 
Blackmun, J ....................... . 1. ................ . 
../ Powell, J ..... . ..... ... ............................. . 
Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. V. . . . . ............... . 
Stevens, J .................... . { . . . . . ............... . 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • 0 0 ••• 0 ••• • •• • ••• •••••••••• •• •••• 0 ••••• 0 ••••• 0 ••••• 0. 0 0 •• 0. 0 0. 0. 0. 0 0. 0 •• 
the securitieS~ o~ ~c;J~~ ?L~,S -(n\ 
d ackgrotkd - i' 
Petr made the paradigmatic fraudulent pledge that the 
government believes should be actionable under the antifraud 
provisions of the Securities Acts. He was instrumental in 
obtaining for his firm, Tri-State Energy Inc., loans totalling 
$475,000 from a bank through the use of numerous false 
representations, bribery and the pledge of worthless stock as 
collateral. The stock was made to appear valuable through the _ ____ __________..... 
' r . ' 
2. 
submission of fraudulent documentation. When the bank became 
worried, and Tri-State failed to meet a repayment demand, the 
bank attempted to liquidate the collateral. It was able to 
reccover only $2,500 of the $475,000 loan that it believed had ~ 
been secured by $1,700,000 of marketable securities.~~~ 
Petr and his cohorts were convicted on one count of ~../ 
conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. 1014(fraud in a bank loan 
application), 18 U.S.C. 1341 (mail fraud), 18 U.S.C. 1343(wire 
fraud), and §17(a) of the 1933 Act. In affirming petr's 
conv1ction, CA2 did not address petr 's claim that a pledge 
"'--
not a sale within the meaning of §17(a), apparently relying 
its full exposition of this question in United States 




Gentile, 530 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 426 U.S. 936 
(1976). 
This Court att~pted to resolve whether a pledge was a 
sale 
'1 L 
under §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the 1R 34 Act in Bankers 
Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381 (1978), but a concession by 
resp at oral arguement to DIG. The file on Mallis -
contains a bench memo Bob Comfort, hich argues that a pledge 
is not a sale and tha ted the spirit ofvai ue Chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), by continuing 
to federalize corporation law in the face of the plain meaning 
of the definition of sale in the 1934 Act. Bob also suggested 
that CA2 's rule conflicted with your opinion for the Court in 
~nited Housing Federation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), which 




"security",because the purchaser wished to obtain housing rather 
than a teturn on investment. In the pledge situation, the 
lender's primary purpose is to receive interest payments on the 
loan rather than to realize a return on its interest in the 
pledged securities. Your annotations of Bob's memo indicate that 
you agreed with him and that you thought that "CA2 is dead 
~.rrong." 
This analysis presents some difficulty when applied to /1'~3 
the 1933 Act. The definition of "sale" at §2(3) of the 1933 Act ~ 
is very ~oad; it expre~sly includ~' every .•• disposition of a~ 
secur·~ interest in a security for ~e." This language ca
encompass a pledge: the pledgor conveys a security interest in 
the stock that entitles the pledgee to sell it upon default, in 
partial consideration for the pledgor's loan of funds. Thus, the 
CA2' s decision has a basis in the language of the Act. It is 
unclea~hat the Court will have to parse the purposes and 
policies of the Act, as it did in Forman, to properly decide the 
issue. 
The first case to hold that a pledge is a sale under 
the 1933 Act was 
cert. denied 364 
SEC v. Guild Films, 
u.s. 819 (1960). -
279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), C/iz. 
'-"""- I tf h () 
That case subjected the 
pledgee to liability as an underwriter for sale, upon default, 
of unregistered securities; the key holding ws that a pledgee 
"purchases" stock under §2 ( 11), the definition of which mirrors 
thedefinition of sale under §2(3). In United States v. Gentile, 
supra, CA2 relied on Guild Films to hold that a fraudulent 
4. 
pledge of stock violated §17(a) of the Act. The court reasoned 
that "the pledgee assumes a very real investment risk that the 
pledged securities will have continuing value, a risk that is 
identical in nature to the risk taken by iunvestors whi~ch 
serves as the indisputable basis for stautory regulation of 
securities transactions." 530 F.2d at 467. This "investment 
JL. 
risk" theory con~~~t~ tly has been offered to justify Securities ---- () 
Acts coverage of pledge transact ions. See--··Mansbach v. Prescott, 
Ball & Turben 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979);/Mallis v. FDIC, 568 
F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed 435 U.S. 388 (1978), 
extended this rationale to claims under Rule 1 Ob-5 of the 1934 CA 'Z-
h-~ 
Act without any comment on the difference in language of the ,Z: 
1 
i') p 
definition of sale in the latter statute, which does not contain~ -~ 
any mention of the disposition of an interest in a security. ~~1~ 
~ I tJ t-rt- t {) f/d ,-
The leading cases rejecting CA2' s analysis are Lincoln tf{.YI/ ~ 
Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1979) and --National Bank of Lubbock, 497 F.2d 1974 (5th c,A s d 
{..~1 
~_:,1f 1974), cert. denied 420 U.S. 930 (1975). These cases 
nef· ·~ advance three arguments why neither Act covers pledge 
C ~Phansactions~ the legislative history of the Acts contain 
yr no indication that Congress was concerned about the pledge of 
securities. ~ the ~ee more accurately bears a 
commercial risk than an investment risk; while the worth of the 
securities may have been fraudulently inflated, this can happen 
to any form of collateral. The underlying character of a pledge 




(1979)( 1 --: t' . t~~~ v. Daniel, 439 u.s. 551 emp oyee s par 1c1pa 10n 1n 
noncontributory, compulsory pension plan not a "security" 
because underlying motive is to obtain a livlihood). ~ 
state law extensively occupies the field. Articles 8 and 9 of 
the U.C.C., governing respectively transfers of securities and 
secured transactions, and the common law set the terms of the 
loan transaction and provide remedies for the injured party. 
Two additional pragmatic reasons for not applying the 
securities 1 ws to secured loans occur to me. F~t, federal an~ 
state criminal fraud provisions will often already apply to the ~ 
~ 
pledgor 1 s acts. In this case, petr was charges with mail and 
wire fraud and fraud of a federally insured bank. Thus, criminal ~ 
prosecution under §17(a) will often be duplicative. Second, th~l.f~~;-­
pledgee will often be a sophisticated commercial party engag ~~3~L~ 
----------------~ > ,~~~~ 
in an arm's legnth transaction where it can negotiate protective 
terms. This situation may be contrasted with the distribution of 
numerous securities to the public by professional underwriters. 
CONTENTIONS: (A) Language of the statute: "The 
starting point in evry case involving construction of a statute 
is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 756 
(Powell, J., concurring). Petr argues that "sale" and "pledge" 
are words having long-standing definitions; to construe a pledge 
to be a sale under the Securities Acts would pervert the 
ordinary meanings of commonly used terms. When securities are 
pledged, title does not pass; the pledgor retains the rights to 
sell the stock subject to the security interest, to vote the 
6. 
stock, to receive dividends, and to pay taxes on the income. The 
pledgee gains only a right of possession and a contingent right 
to sell the stock on default, subject to a fiduciary duty to 
repay the excess of the value over the debt. The definition of 
sale does not expressly include pledge transactions; that this 
was not an oversight is indicated by the definition of sale in 
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, which expressly 
includes pledges within the definition of sale. Petr and amicus 
Bossier Bank argue that the broad definition of sale in the 
1933 Act must be modified by the narrower definition in the 1934 
Act. The courts which have considered the issue have decided 
uniformily that the definitions of sale in the fraud provisions 
of the 1934 Act and the 1933 Act should be read indentically to 
include or exclude pledges. Thus to read the 1933 Act broadly 





unless the Court were willing to give the provisions 
meanings. Why they should not be given different 
commeasurate with their differnent language is not 
Resp (SG) relies on the broad 





disposition of an interst in a security for value. The pledgor 
conveys an interest, the right of possession and the conditional 
right of sale upon default; the pledgee gives value. The use of 
the words "include" and "every" emphasize Congress's intent to 
de infe the terms broadly. See United States v. Naftal in, 441 
7. 
U.S. 768, 773 (1979). That the definition does not mention 
pledges is irrelevent, because the language is generic and has 
been been held to include numerous transactions that are not 
common law sales: mergers, puts, calls and options. To read this 
definition to exclude pledges would render the part of the 
definition that concerns disposition of "every intrest" a 
nullity. Petr is not aided by the more restrictive language of 
the 1934 Act; the anti-fraud provisions of the two Acts need not 
be read identically when their language differs. See e.g., Blie 
Chip Stamps, supra, 421 U.S. at 733 n.6. 
(B) Legislative History: Petr and amicus stress that 
the legislative history makes no mention of an intention to 
regulate pledges of securities. Resp concedes as much, but 
offers an ingenious argument that Congress intended to include 
pledges within the definit.ion of sale. First, in 1933, it was 
established at common law and under the Uniform Negotiable 
Instruments Act that pledging securities as collateral for a 
loan disposed of an interst in the security for value. See 
National City Bank v. Wagner, 216 F. 473, 481-82 (7th Cir. 
1914). The ordinary meaning of the terms of Act, as understood 
by Congress in 1933, includes pledges within the definition of 
sale. This understanding is made manifest if one looks at the 
origin of the definition of sale in the 1933 Act; it was adopted 
from the Uniform Sale of Scurities Act. This origin appears both 
from the language of the definition of sale in the Uniform Act, 
which is virtually identical to §2(3), and the tstimony before 
8. 
Congress of one of the architects of the 1933 Act. See Federal 
Securities Act; Hearings on H.R. 4314 Before theHouse Comm. on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73rd Cong., !st Sess. 10 
(1933)(remarks of Huston Thompson). A draft of the Uniform Act 
had defined sale by 1 i sting numerous transact ions, including 
pledges; the adopted draft contained the broad gneric language 
used as a model for §@ ( 3) . One year before the passage of the 
1933 Act,the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted 
the definition of sale in the Uniform Act to include a pledge. 
Cecil B De Mille Productions, Inc. v. Woolery, 61 F.2d 45 (9th 
Cir. 1932). "[W]here ••• Congress adopts a new law incorporating 
sections of a prior 
have had knowledge 
law, Congress normally can be presumed to 
of the interpretation given to the 
least insofar as it affects the new 
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978). But cf. 
incorporated law, at 
statute." Lorillard v. 
Aaron v. SEC, 48 U.S.L.W. 4609, 4615 n. 18 (June 2, 1980)("But, 
in the absence of any indication that Congress was even aware of 
[N.Y. State court decision construing model for § 17 (a) of the 
1933 Act not to require scienter as a predicate for injunctive 
relief obtained by the state Attorney General], much less that 
it approved of the decision, it cannot fairly be inferred that 
Congress intended not only to adopt the language of [the state 
model], but also a state judicial interpretation of the statute 
so at odds with the plain meaning of the language Congress 
adopted as § 1 7 (a) ( 1 ) • ") 
(C): Policy: The policy arguments in this case address 
9. 
the issues of what are the overarching purposes of the 
Securities Acts, and whether attacking fraudulent pledges of 
securities under the Acts serves the Congressional purpose. Petr 
and amicus argue that the purpose of the Acts is to protect 
investors and insure the integrity of the securities markests. 
The Bank here made a loan, it did not "invest" in securities. It 
-------------------------------r---
looked for a-return on it commitment of funds from the interest 
it charged on the loan, not from a rise in the value of the 
securities that it could not capture. Moreover, the loan 
transaction had no impact on the price of the securities in the 
market. Thus, applying the "economic reality" test of Forman, 
the transaction falls outside the concerns of the securities 
laws. Finally, the field of pledge transactions is extensively 
occupied by state law, which also provides civil remedies for 
defrauded lendors. 
Resp answers that the gaols of the securities laws are 
more generous than petr claims. The laws were passed in the 
midst of an economic crisis and Congress understood that 
fraudulent practices in securities harms "honest business". 
United States v. ·Naftalin, supra, 441 U.S. at 775, quoting S. 
Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). Congress explcitly 
stated that the manipulation of securities prices injured the 
banking system by preventing the fair valuation of collateral 
for loans. 15 U.S.C. 78b (1934 Act). That the Act is not solely 
concerned with protecting investors is demostrated by Naftalin, 
supra, where the Court held that fraud on a broker, worked 
1 0. 
through a short selling scheme, was cognizable depsite the lack 
of direct impact on investors. The Act was intended to protect 
honest corporate business as well as investors. Moreover, 
fraudulent pledges can ultimately injure investors, as when the 
lendor upon default resells the worthless securities to an 
unsuspecting public. It is plain that Congress is now concerned 
with the use of fraudulent pledges as a means of distributing 
stolen, counterfeit or worthless securities to the public by 
organized crime. 
Resp argues that petr's attempt to create a dichotomy 
between investment risk and commercial risk, Lincoln Nat'l Bank 
v. Herber, supra, 604 F.2d at 1043, introduces a concept which 
has no basis in the Securities Acts. Moreover, the pledgor does 
take an investment risk. The lender sets his rates and terms in 
part on the asumption that the collateral will protect him in 
the event of default. He takes a risk that the securities will 
have a value beyond the amount of money owed him. If the value 
of the securities plummets, or is illusory, the pledgee will 
lose its assets. 
Finally, the overlap in regulation among the 
Securities Acts, other federal criminal laws, and state law is, 
as this Court has said, neither "unusual nor unfortunate." SEC 
v. National Securities Inc., 393 u.s. 453, 468 (1969). Moreover, 
the state remedies will often be useless to the defrauded 
pledgee; in this case the securities wre worthless, the borrower 




necessary to deter this fraudulent behavior. t.4-' ~~ 
DISCUSSION: The most intelligent thing writ ten about ~ 
this case presents was written by Professor Loss in ~ 
1061 in criticizing the decision in SEC v. Guild Films, supra: 
the issue 
"It is probably easier under the language of §2(3) 
- 'every .•. disposition of a security, or interest 
in a security, for value' - to say that a pledge 
involves a sale than that it does not •••• This 
question in itself seems of little consequence 
except as bearing on the question whether a 
fraudulent pledgor violates §17(a) .•• But feder~al I 
legislation was hardly needed for privately 
negotiated pledge transactions between borrowers 
and lenders." 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 649. 
In other words, the language and history of §2 ( 3) seems to 
include pledges, but no persuasive reason appears why pledges 
should be covered. 
The language of §2(3) is as broad a definition of sale ~ 
as can be imagined; thus, the fact that "sale" and "pledge" ar
entirely distinct terms in general understanding and at common~ 
law does not advance petr's argument. It seems inescapable that ~ ?z(~J 
the pledgee-lender does take an interest in the securities,~~· 
( /l.J' .;( 
albeit a somewhat remote one, and does give value for that ~·~ 
interest in making the loan at certain terms. Under the U.C.C. a ~~ 
d.- 1A 1/_ A~ 11' 
pledgee is a purchaser for value who is protected by the bona /~1 
fide purchaser ruffl. Furthermore, the SG amkes a convincing 
---------------------------
argument that this was the law in 1933. 
The SG~ment that c :ngress should be held to the S G- S 
interpretation given the model language of §2(3), in hte Unifor~
Sale of Securities Act, by a federal Court of Appeals is 
1 2 • 
helpful, if overstated. That decision, Cecil B. De Mille 
Productions v. Woolery, seems sound, given that an early draft 
of the Uniform Act that listed numerous particualar transaction 
as sales included pledges. 
argument about the effect of 
model provision was rejected 
As mentioned above, a similar 
a judicial interpretation of a 
v 
by the Court in Aaron v. SEC, 
supra. There the Court held that that the plain meaning of 
§17(a)(1) of the 1933 Act, which speaks of "any device, scheme, 
or artifice to defraud", requires the SEC to show scienter to 
enjoin practices. The SEC argued that a New York court had 
construed the state predecessor of §17(a) not to require 
scientor for enforcement actions by the state attorney general. 
The Court seems to have rejected the argument because the state 
court decision conflicted with the plain meaning of the language 
of the provision and, to a lesser extent, because there was no 
indication that Congress was aware of the decision. Here, the 
interpretation is perfectly consistent 
statute. There is no indication that Congress was aware of 
-ll 
Woolery. The conclusion I reach is that Congress, without ever 
focussing on whether the 1933 Act should apply to pledges, 
accepted a definition of sale in § 2 ( 3 )· which could under 
familiar legal principles and had been construed to include 
pledges. Although Congress made no mention of pledges it defined 
sale to be every disposition of an interst in a security for 
value. This could be dispositive because the Court has said on 
numerous occassions that the language and legislative history of 
t 
j£1c-~•4-'"f 7 J~) k 
r (~ad: 
the Securities Acts can settle a question of interpretation 
without consideration 6-f policy arguments. See e.g., Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 u.s. 185, 215 n. 33 (1976). 
This analysis does not entirely satisfy, however, for 
two reasons. First, applying §17(a) to commercial loans seems to 
, ______________________________________ _ 
extend the scope of the 193 3 Act beyond its purpose. Second, 
there seems no practical need for the extension. 
Use of securities as collateral is an incidental part 
of a loan agreement. While the lender is concerned that the 
securities be worth what the borrower claims, this would be true 
if the collateral were accounts receivable or real property. The 
lender has no concern that the securities rise in value or pay a 
good dividend. Indeed, a serious decline in value will not 
concern the lender until the value of the securities decends to 
near the amount of the loan outstanding. Even this decline works 
no harm on the lender unless the borrower defaults. Thus, while 
the lender cares about the value of the securities, it stretches 
reality to say that he is taking an investment risk; he is 
taking a familiar commercial risk that the borrower will not 
repay the loan and that the collateral will not have the value 
the borrower represented. This paradigm is regulated by numerous 
laws which give the lender civil remedies and subject the 
fraudulent borrower to criminal penalties. 
The SG's other policy arguments are also 
unsatisfactory. Congress expressed a concern about the effect of 
manipulation on securities prices on banks, not a concern about 
14. 
fraudulent collateral, as the SG implies. The problem of sham 
pledges used to distribute stolen and counterfeit securities 
does not require a holding that bona fide pledges are sales. 
Naftalin involved a fraud which) while not directly injuring 
investors, was intimately related to the operation of the 
securities market. The only policy arguments favoring including 
pledges within §17(a) are that securities are hard to value 
accurately, thus making them attractive subjects for fraud, that 
the lenders cilil remedies will be useless when the borrower is 
bankrupt, and that the borrower may fall through the cracks of 
the criminal law of fraud. These considerations are minor. 
Bob Comfort suggested that holding a pledge to be a 
sale conflicts with United Housing Foundation v. Forman. This is 
true only in part. That case eschewed a literal interpretation 
of the word "security" and held that shares of stock in a 
nonprofit housing cooperative were not securities. The Court 
there applied a test of "economic reality", and focussed on the 
fact that the shareholders wre attracted by acquiring a place to 
live, rahter than by the promise of realizing a return on their 
investment. If teh economic reality test applies to this case, a 
pledge is not a sale under Forman. However, 
what extent the reality over language 
it is not clear to 
analysis governs 
interpretation of the Acts. Forman discusses the principle as 
one of general applicibility, (and indeed cites McClure v. First 
National Bank, the CAS case which held that a pledge is not a 
sale, for the proposition), but the Court seems only to have 
1 5. 
applied to principle to the question of whether something is a 
security. See also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 u.s. 332 ( 1967). 
u!-L 
Rather, the Court has paid closest attention in construing the ~ 
antifraud provisionsof the Securities Acts to the actual ~ 
language of specific provisions. See Sante Fe v. Green; Aaron v. ~ ~ 
SEC; rnst & Ernst v. Hochfelder;~lue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug~ 
Stores, (Powell, J., concurring). It would appear that only when 
a term is not defined in the Act, e.g., security, or the 
language is inscrutable has the Court ventured far beyond 
language chosen by Congress. Thus, while theCA's decision in 
this case conflicts with the Forman analysis of the scope of the 
Securities Acts, it does not conflict with the holding of that -
case because the policies of the Acts need not be examined here 
where the definition of sale seems to include pledges by its 
terms. 
To avoid this result, it would be necessary to fasten 
on an undefined term in the definition of sale and apply the 
Forman analysis to it. For example, the Court could construe the 
word "interest" not to include pledges. The rationale would be 
that the "interest in a security" spoken of in §2(3) must itself 
be acquired for the purpose of investment, not for the 
collateral purpose of providing security for a loan. While this 
may be an attractive means of limiting the reach of the 
provision, defending the holding would not be easy in light of 
~ t( 11 
the br}~th of the concept of an interest, the intent to include 
"every" interest within the definition, and the SG's argument 
16 0 
about legislative history. This argument is not briefed and I 
~ -could pursue it further if you wish. 
It may be well to note a few issues which are not in 
dispute here. The Court need not decide whether a pledge is a 
'--------------~---------------, 
sale under §10(b) of the 1934 Act; the difference in language 
between the two Acts almost ~ates ~tra--t.--t:hey be ··- - -· d li_ferentlx . The significance of this is that there is no 
private right of action at present under §17(a) of the 1933 Act. 
Also, the Court need not decide whether a pledgee who resells 
stock is an underwriter under §2(11); that question would turn 
on whether the foreclosing pledgee puchased with an eye to 
distribute or sold as an agent of the pledgor. If the Court 
holds that a pledge is not a sale, it will have to address in 
the future whether the sale of the collateral by the pledgor 
after foreclosure is a "sale" cognizable under the fraud 
provisions of the Securities Acts. 
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William Rubin, Petitioner,! On Writ of Certiorari to the 1/1/ 3"'/ 
v. United States Court of Appeals 
United States. for the Second Circuit. . ·~ #. ~ -J-:-J . 
tL~ 
[January -, 1981] ~ h:r 
C HIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of the Court. ~
We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether a  
pledge of stock to a bank as collateral for a loan is an "offer ' 
or sale" of a security under § 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 
1933, 15 lJ S. C. 77q (a) . J( J ~ 
Late in 1972, petitioner became vice president of Tri-State ~ 
Energy, Inc., a corporation holding itself out as involved in  
energy exploration and production. At the time, Tri-State 
was experiencing serious financial problems. Petitioner ap-~ /7 P c/. 7 . 
proached Bankers Trust Company, a ban1< with which he W~ ~ n. 
had frequently dealt while he had been affiliated with an • I' ' 
accounting firm. Bankers Trust initially refused a $5 million 
loan to Tri-State for operating a mine. Nevertheless, it lent 
Tri-State $50,000 on October 20, 1972, for 30 days with the 
understanding that if Tri-State could produce adequate finan-
cial information and sufficient collateral, additional financing 
might be available. 
Petitioner assisted other officers of Tri-State in preparing 
a financial statement for submission to the bank. The bal-
ance sheet, which hsted a net worth of $7.1 million, was false 
and misleading in several respects.1 Tri-State also submitted 
' The balance sheet lbted au account receivable of $7.5 million and 
included a copy of a contract that purportedly formed the ba<iis of tlus 
accounL No SllCh item existf•d, and the signature on the contract had 
' . 
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~nt,lated projections of future earnings based in large measure 
on sham contracts and forged documentation. Subsequently, 
petitio11er personally paid the loan officer $4,000 and another 
official $1,000 as inducements for further loans. Tri-State 
borrowed a,n additional $425,000 over a six-week period.2 
Ultimately, the loaus were consolidated into a single demand 
note for $475,000, dated F~bruary 26, 1973. 
Bankers Trust required collateral for each new loan; be-
tween October 20, 1972, aud January 19, 1973, Tri-State 
. pledged ~tock iu six companies. The stocks were represented 
as being good, m~rketa.ble, and unrestricted and valued at a 
total of approximately $1.7 millioll; 8 i11 fact, they were 
practically worthless. Mauy shares were issued by ushelF' 
companies. Most were simply "rented"-i. e., borrowed from 
the owner for a fee- to show to the bauk or were otherwise 
restricted. In one instance, petitioner arranged for fictitious 
quotations to appear iu a service reporting over-the-counter 
trans~ctions aud used by the bank in evaluating pledged 
securities; in another, 'l'ri-State planted, through others, a 
fictitious advertiserneiJt iu an overseas newspaper aucl showed 
it to the bank, repre~;eutiug it to be a quotation. Trading 
been iorg~d. Evidence al:,o indicated tl1at Tri-State had lb1:ed a fictitious 
tax liability to off~t the fictitiouo U<>tiet. The ~:;tatement abo referred to 
over $264,000 cash on hand and coal worth $180,000. Both figures were 
exaggerated. 
2 S\lbsequent loans were made on November 22 ($50,000) , ovember 30 
($100,000), and becember 6 ($275,000) . 
a The pledges were 400,000 ::;hares of American Leisure Corp. (October 
20-:;!lell company; ~hare~ ret;tricted); ~.OW ~hares of All Statet; Life ln-
10\lfanc~ Co. (Noven1oer 10-nomnarketu.ble; '' rented" to show the bank 
but not owned 'by Tri-State) ; Marlin Inve~:;tment Co. (November 22-
20,000 shares ; "rented" from a person who was told they would not be 
used as collateral} ; Management. Dynamic:;, Inc. (December 6-100,000 
:;hare~> ; trading :mspeuued ; withdrawn as collateral) ; General Investment 
Corp. (December 19-175,000 :siHtre~:;; rti<>tricted) ; Satellite Systems Corp. 
(Jamiary 19-- re:stricted •ttHl "Jeuled."; fictitiou;; oversea~ advelttsement 
viauteq). 
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of one is~ue was suspeudeu shortly after the pledge when the 
issuiug company could 11ot account for 900,000 shares of its 
stoc:k; Tri-8tate replaced this collateral before Bankers Trust 
learned of the difficulty. Petitioner acted as Tri-State's agent 
for most of these transactions. 
A Justice Department request for information about Tri-
State received February 28, two days after the consolidated 
note was signed, prompted Bankers Trust 011 March 5 to 
dmHand payment in fuU within three days. No payment of 
this demand· was made, and iu May another officer of Tri. 
8tate met with bank officials aud tried to forestall foreclosure. 
After rejecti11g Tri-State's request for a further loa11, the 
bank sued on the note. 
Bankers Trust also proceeded agai11st petitioner personally 
as a guarautor of the loaus. Petitioner signed a confessiou of 
judgment against himself in the anwun t of the unpaid loans, 
plus accrued illterest, but thereafter filed a petition for bank· 
ruptcy. The bank recovered only about $'2,500, plus interest 
and expeuses. on its $475,000 loan. 
Petitioner was indicted on , threE> counts of violating and 
conspiring to violate various federal antifraud statutes, in· 
eluding § 17 (a) of the ~ecurities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 77q (a).f .Following a jury trial in the United States Dis-
trjct Court for· the :o;outhcrn histrict of New York, petitioner 
was convicted on the conspiracy count. On appeal to the 
Court of Appeals for the Secolll1 Circuit, petitioner raised 
•5 Count 1 of the indidment rhnrgl'd pt>tit.ioner and hi~> codefendants wjth 
consptrmg to violate 1"' U S C. § 1014 ( frnud in n bank loa.n a.pplica· 
tion), 18 U. S. G § 1341 (mail frnml). and 18 U. S. C. § 1343 (wire 
fraud), ru well as § 17 (n,) (Krr·uritie" fraud) . Count.- 2 and 3 alleged 
substantiv(\ .-ub;o;tantive vJolation" of § 17 (a) and 18. F. S. C. § 1014 against 
p£Jtitioncr nnd somo of the codefendaJit<:l h"ted in the conspira.cy count. 
Proceedinp;,.; ngain~t the pctit.wtwr wPt'l' scverE'd before trial. The Govem-
ment. a.greed to dismiss the f'ubsta nt.JVe r·hargr of fraud in a bank loan ap-
plication befom tt rcnclwd thP jury, and t!JP JUry acquitt-ed petitioner of t.h& 
suQ.stantive connt. of sccuritie~ fr11.ud. 
?~1013-0PINION 
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several grounds, including whether a pledge of stock as col~ 
lateral for a bank loan is an "offer or sale" under § 17 (a). 
The Court of Appeals affirr'ned. 609 F. 2d 51 (CA2 1979):5 
We granted certiorari limited to the question whether such 
a pledge is an "offer or sale." 445 U. S. 960 (1980) . 
II 
Sectiou 17 (a) of the ecurities Act of 1933 provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or 
·ale of any securities by use of any means or instruments 
of trausportation or co1rnnu11icatiun in interstate com-
merce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
,, (1 ) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to de-
fraud, or 
" (2) to obtaiu money or property by means of any 
untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to 
' tate a material fact necessary ill order to make the 
statements made, ill the light of the circumstances under 
which they Wel'e malfe, l'lot l11isleaUillg, Of 
" (3) to engage in any transactio11, practice, or course 
of busiuess which Operates Ot would OlJerate as a fraud 
or deceit upou the }Jutchaser." 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a) 
(emphasis added). 
Petitioner does uot deny that he eugaged in a couspiracy to 
commit fraud through false represeutations to Tri-State con-
cerning the stocks p1eJgl:ld; he does uot deny that the shares 
were "securities;; uude't the Act. Rathel', he contends nar-
rowly that th~se p1edges tiid uot coustitute "offers" or "sales" 
under § 17 (a) of the Act. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6.6 To sustain 
b The Court of Appeab divided over an evidentiary issue. It rejected 
petitioner's argument regarding the scope of § 17 (a) without comment. 
See 609 F . 2d, at 66 
~ The mi~; repre:>entat ionR at issue in this ca~e related lu the !:ltocks 
them,;;elve:; ; petitiorwr dot's not allege Lhat hi~ convictio11, insofar as it 
inv·olved secUthi\lb fraud under § 17 (a) , w~ based on tlli.;;repre-scnMlollS 
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~his couteutiuu, peti~tioner argues that Tri-State deposited the 
stocks with the bank only as collateral security for a loan, not 
a a transfer or sale. From this he argues that the implied 
power to dispose of the stocks could ripen into title and there-
by constitute a "sale" only by effecting foreclosure of the 
various pledges, an event that could not occur without a de-
fault on the loaus. 
We beg'in by looking to the lauguage of§ 17 (a) of the Act. 
E. y., Ernst & Ernst v. Huchfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976). 
The terms "offer" and " ale" in § 17 (a) are defined in § 2 (3) 
oi the Act : 
"The term 'sale' or 'sell' shall i11clude every contract of 
sale or disposition of a security or interest in a secur-ity, 
ior value. The term ... 'offer' shall include every 
attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to 
buy, a security ur interest in a security, for value." 15 
C S. C § 77L (3) (emphasis added). 
Obtaining a loau secured by a pledge of shares of stock 
uumistakably i11volves a "dispositio11 of ... [au] interest in 
a security, for value." Although pledges transfer less than 
absolute title, the interest thus tra11sferred nonetheless is an 
''interest in a security." The pledges contemplated a self-
executing procedure umler a }Jower that could, at the option 
of the pledgee (the bank) in the event of a default, vest 
absolute title and ownership. Baukers Trust parted with f /-
substantia] consideratiuu-specifically, a total of $475,000-to '?1..-o niJ 
obtain the iuchoate but valuable interest under the pledges and 
concomitant powers. H is not essential under the terms of 
the Act that full title pass to a transferee for the transaction 
to be an "offer' ' or a "sale." See, e y., United States v. 
tnttde about the financial euudition of Tri-State itsdf. Thu::., we noou not 
decide whether mi~repre:sentation:; or umi:s:;ion, involved in a :securities 
transaction but noL [>t~rtammg to the t-ecurihe::; them::;elve::> can form tbe 
1:.>«-~is of a viohttton ot' ~ 17 (u). 
' . 
(j RLl:H.N' v. UNITED STATE$ 
Gent·ile, 530 F'. 2tl 4.61, 466 (CA~), cert. deuied, 4~6 U. ' 
IJ36 (1976). 
III 
When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, juuicial 
inquiry is complete. Aaron v. SEC,- U.S.-,- (1980); 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, supra, at 214, n. 33. Neverthe-
less, we note that our reading is wholly consistent with the 
history and the purposes of the Securities Act of 1933. The 
Uniform Sale of Secunties Act, a model "blue sky" statute 
adopted iu many states, defined "sale" in language almost 
identical to that now appearing in § 2 (3).7 lu Cec-il B. 
De Mille Product·ions, lnc. v. Woolery, 61 F. 2d 45 (CA9 
1932), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit con-
strued ~his provision of the model statute as adopted by 
Califomia and held that the definitiou of asale" embraced a 
pledge. Congress subsequently e11acted the definition from 
the Uniform Act almost verbatim. See Federal Securities 
Act: Hearings on H. R. 4314 before the House Committee 
on Interstate and }.,oreign Commerce, 73d Coug., 1st Sess., 
11 (1933). See generally id., at 13; Securities Act: Hearings 
on S. 875 before the Senate Committee ou Banking and Cur-
rency, 73d Cong., 1st Bess., 71 (1933). Petitioner has cited 
nothing to suggest that Co11gress did not in tend the broad 
scope that cases arising under the Uniform Act, such as 
Woolery , 8'upra, had given the definitions of "sale." See 
~orillard v. Poru;, 434 U. S. 575, 581 (1978). 
Treating pledges as included among "offers" and "sales" 
comports with the purpose of the Act and, specifically, with 
that of § 17 (a). We frequently have observed that these 
provisions were enacted to protect against frauu and promote 
the free flow of information in the public dissemination of 
7 Natwuul Confprencc of Colllmissioncr:; on Uniform State Laws, Hand-
book and ProeePding:s 174 (19::!\:l} (Fourth all(l Final Draft) ("sale" 
defined to "include evl'ry ui~po~ition, or attempt to di~pose of a security 
or int~l'etit in n, ,o;ecurity for value"L 
9-1013-0i'i, ;IO:N 
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l!!ecuritie~ . E. fl ., Cnited States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 
774 (1979); Ernst & Ernst v. Huchfelder, supra, at 195. The 
economic collsideratious and realities present when a lendel' 
parts with value and accepts securities as collateral security 
for a loau are uot significantly Jiffereut from the risk an in-
vestor undertakes whe11 purchasiug shares. Both are rely-
ing on the value of the securities themselves, and both must 
be able to depend on the representations made by the t rans-
feror of the securities, regardless of whether the transferol' 
passes full title or only a conditional ami defeasible interest 
to secure repayment of a loau." 
IV 
IS Court has held that the antifraud provislOIIS of the 
tr
federal securities la.ws must be construed "uot technically and 
estrictively, but flexibly to effectuate l their j remedial pur-
)OSes." SEC v. Capital Gair~s Research Bureau, Inc., 375 
U. S. 180, 195 19" Petitioner would have us interpret 
o er an "sale" in a way that not only is cramped but 
conflicts with the plam meaniu of the statute and its ur ose 
as we . ere ore o d at e p edges here were 
"offers" or ''sales' uuder ~ 17 (a); accordingly, the judgment 
of the Court ot Appeals i 
Affirmed. 
s To the exknt that r~titioJJer argue:; there ww; no need to protect 
pledgees, the very fact that Congre::;;; :>aw fit to afford Hll eh protectior! 
ends ot)r in4uiry, absent a contention, not prc::;ent here, thaL the Con:stitu-
tiou directly prohibit~ tlw means sdected. •'Our individual apprai::;al of 
the wisdom or unw1:-<dom of a particular cour::;e consciuu:oly ::;eleeted by 
the Congre:;::; i~; to be put tll:!ide m the process of intl'rprcting a :statute. 
Once the meaniug of an enactment IH di::;t'erned and itH conHtitutionality 
determined, the judicial proces:; coml'8 to an end." 'l'enuessee Valley 
.i.~!tlwrity v Hill, 4a7 •. s 15a, ll:l4 (I97t{). 
CHAMBERS OF , 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
~u.pttmt <!Jaurl af tqt 'Jlfuittb :§t~ts 
'J!Uasfrington, l9. <!f. 2.0.?J!.~ 
January 8, 1981 
Re: 79-1013 - Rubin v. U.S. 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.;:oJupl":mtt Q}lflttt of fiTt~b ~fa±tg 
~rutlp:ttghm. ~. QJ. 2Ilbl'!-~ 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
January 8, 1981 
Re: No. 79-1013, Rubin v. United States 
Dear Chief, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
j)uprmu <!fottrl of Hr~ ~b ,jtalt$' 
~a,g!pnghrn. ~. Q}. 2.0glJL.j . 
CHAMBERS OF , 
JUSTICE w ... . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
January 8, 1981 / 
.. 
•· 
RE: No. 79-1013 Rubin v. United States 
Dear Chief: 
I am happy to join your op1n1on in the above. I do, however, 
offer the following suggestions: 
l. On p. 5, you write, "Bankers Trust parted with substantial 
consideration -- specifically, a total of $475,000 -- to obtain the 
inchoate but valuable interest under the pledges and concomitant 
powers." I read this sentence to mean that the reason Bankers y 
Trust gave consideration was for the purpose of obtaining a security 
interest. In fact, Bankers Trust also expected that its loan would 
be repaid, and repaid with interest. Might it not be preferable to 
say, "Hankers Trust parted with substantia 1 consideration -- specifi-
cally a total of $475,000 -- and as part of the transaction obtained 
the inchoate," etc. 
2. On p. 6, your first sentence in Part III seems to me some-
what too emphatic, since "a thing may be within the letter of the 
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its 
spirit, nor within the intention of its makers." Church of the Holy 
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). Holy Trinity re-
mains good law in appropriate circumstances. See TVA v. Hill, 437 
U.S. 153, 187, n. 33 (1978); Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707,714 
(1975). Ought not,therefore, the word "ordinarily" be added before 
the word "complete" at the end of the sentence? 
3. On p. 7, line 5, I suggest substitution of the words "not 
significantly different from" for the words "similar in important 
respects to. 11 
Sincerely, 
fl 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBE RS OF 
~u.prttttt <qmtrl of tqt ~ttittb ;§tattg 
'JlD' a.g fringhrn. ~. <!J. 20bl ){. ~ 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE January 8 1 19 81 
RE: No. 79-1013, Rubin v. United States 
Dear Bill: 
In regard to your memo of today: 
(1) As to your suggestion for page 5, I see no real I? 
difference between our two forms but will change 1' 
the opinion to read: ' 
and obtained the inchoate but valuable 
interest • • • • 
(2) As to page 6, I will change the beginning of Part 
III to read: 
When we find the terms of a statute 
unambiguous, judicial inquiry is 
com~lete, except in "'rare and 
exceptional circumstances.'" Tennessee 
Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 
187 n. 33 (1978) (quoting Crooks v. 
Harrelson, 282 u.s. 55, 60 (1930)). See 
Aaron v. SEC, U.S. , (1980) ~ 
Ernst & Ernst v:-Hochfelder, supra, at 
214, n. 33. 
(3) As to page 7, I will change the sentence to read 
"similar in important respects to •••• " 
Also, I am changing the first sentence of footnote 
8 to read: 
To the extent that petitioner argues there was 
no need to protect pledgees, the very fact 
that Congress saw fit to afford such 
protection under the Commerce Clause, u.s. 
Const., Art. I, § 8, ~- 3, ends our inquiry, 
absent a contention, t present here, that 
the Constitution othe wise prohibits the means 
selected. / 
lAf:iO 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
.§npunu <!Juttd uf fltt 'J!fuitth ;§hrltg 
~a%f!rittgwn.lf}. <!J. 20.?>!-~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
January 8, 1981 
Re: 79-1013 - Rubin v. United States 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
)~ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
January 8, 1981 
79-1013 Rubin v. United States 
Dear Chief: 
I will be happy to join your opinion in this case 
if you omit the first sentence in Part IV. 
This sentence cites the 1963 case of SEC v. 
Capital Gains Research Bureau, quoting language to the 
effect that federal security laws must be construed •not 
technically and restrictively but flexibly to effectuate 
[their] remedial purposes.• 
A number of more recent decisions, for example, 
Hochfelder relied on by your opinion, have looked primarily 
to the plain language of the securities acts. These are 
highly technical and well drawn statutes, and as you make 
clear by the remainder of your opinion this case falls 
within the explicit language of SS2(3) and 17(a). Thus, the 
quote from Capital Gains Research Bureau is unnecessary and 
perhaps could be viewed as undercutting to some extent your 
reliance on the statutory language itself. 
On page 5, your draft states: 
•sanker's Trust parted with substantial 
consideration - specifically a total of 
$475,000 - to obtain the inchoate but 
valuable interest under the pledges and 
concomitant powers.• 
Although you are speaking broadly and I can •live 
with• this language if you decide to leave it in the 
opinion, I do not think it is accurate. Any bank officer 
who makes a loan for the purpose of obtaining an inchoate 
interest in collateral should be fired. Collateral may be 
indispensable to the extension of credit, but lending 
2. 
officers of the bank I represented were instructed never to 
make a loan on the assumption that it probably could be 
repaid only by liquidating the borrower's collateral. 
Finally, I wonder whether it wouldn't be helpful 
to say in a footnote that our interpretation of the 1933 Act 
in this case would not be controlling in a case arising 
under the related but different language of the 1934 Act. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
. '"" '• ,, 
;§u.pumt Qfourl of t4t ~td ;§tattg 
.agfringhttt. ~. Of. 2ll.;t){;~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
January 8, 1981 I 
\ \ 
• 
RE: No. 79-1013, Rubin v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 
Your first suggestion really challenges the 1963 01( 
holding, but I do not need it and so will be glad to 
drop the first sentence of Part IV. 
As to page 5--You fire too easily! And "from the 
hip"! The collateral, of course, is a chief factor. I 
would fire the loan officer who did not place the value-
of the collateral ahead of everything-Qecause, at that __ 71 
stage, the bank has not yet parted with dollars~ The • ' 
collateral is what assures payment or the alternative. 
Nevertheless, my change set out in today's memo to Bill 
Brennan will take care of your point. 
As to your final point, we are dealing with § 17(a) 
of the 1933 Act and nothing else. I do not think it 
wise or indeed possible to anticipate how someone may 
read a 1934 Act case. 
Finally, I am changing the first sentence of 
footnote 8 to read: 
To the extent that petitioner argues there was 
no need to protect pledgees, the very fact 
that Congress saw fit to afford such 
protection under the Commerce Clause, u.s. 
Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, ends our inquiry, 
absent a contention, not present here, that 
the Constitution otherwise prohibits the means 
selected. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
Regards, 
f? · ~51 ~ ,l 
'l'o: Mr. Justice Brenn· 
Mr. Justice Ste rt 
Mr. Justice ite 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Kr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Mr. Justice Stevena 
2nd DRAFT 
From: The Chief Justice 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAm 
Circulated: __________ _ 
No. 79-1013 Recirculated: _J_A_N __ 9_l_SS_l_ 
William Rubin, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v. rnitecl States Court of Appeals 
United States. for the Second Circuit. 
[January -, 1981] 
CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether a 
pledge of stock to a bank as collateral for a loan is an "offer 
or sale" of a security under ~ 17 (a) of tlw Securities Act of 
1033. 15 U. S. C. ~ 77q (a). 
I 
Late in 1972, petitioner became vice president of Tri-State 
Energy, Inc .. a corporation holding itself out as involved in 
energy exnlora.tion and production. At the time, Tri-State 
"·as experiencing serious financial problems. Petitioner ap-
proached BankPrs Trust Company. a bank with which lw 
had fre cmen tb rlealt " ·hile he had been affiliated with an 
accounting firm. Bankers Trust initially refused a $5 million 
loan to Tri-State for operating a mine. Nevertheless, it lent 
Tri-State $50,000 on October 20. 1972, for 30 days with the 
understanding that if Tri-State could produce adequate finan-
cial information and sufficient collateral. additional financing 
might be available. 
Petitioner assisted other officers of Tri-State in preparing 
a financial statement for submission to the bank. The bal-
ance sheet, which listed a net worth of $7.1 million , was false 
and misleading in several respects.1 Tri-State also submitted 
1 The balance sheet listed an account receivable of $7.5 million and 
included a copy of a contract that purportedly formed the basis of this 











2 RUBIN v. UNITED STATES 
inflated projections of future earnings based in large measure 
on sham contracts and forged documentation. Subsequently, 
petitioner personally paid the loan officer $4.000 and another 
official $1.000 as inducements for further loans. Tri-State 
borrowed an additional $425.000 over a six-week period.2 
1ITtimately, the loans were consolidated into a single demand 
note for $475.000, dated February 26. 1973. 
Bankers Trust requirC'd collatC'ral for each new loan; be-
tween October 20, 1972. and January 19. 1973. Tri-State 
pkdged stock in six companies. The stocks were represented 
aR being good, marketable. and unrestricted and valuC'd at a 
total of approximately $1.7 million; " in fact. they were 
practically worthless. Many shares wC're issued by "shell" 
companies. Most were simply "rented"-i. e., borro\\'ccl from 
the owner for a fee-to show to tlw bank or were otherwise 
restricted. Tn one instance. prtitioner arrang0d for fictitious 
quotations to appear in a s0rvice rC'porting over-the-counter 
transactions and US(•d hy the bank in evaluating pledged 
sC'curities; in another. Tri-State planted. through others. a 
fictitious advertisement in an oYers('aS JH''vspaper and show('d 
it to the bank. repreS('nting it to be a quotation. Trading 
been forged. Evidcnre al~o indir.1trd t.hat Tri-State had listed a fictitious 
bx liability to off~rt. th<' fict.it ion~ n~Frt. The statcm<'nt. nlso rrfnrrd to 
on>r $264,000 enf'h on hand and roal worth $180,000. Both figlll'<'" wrre 
rxaggerated. 
2 SubsPfJUent lonnR werr mndr on 'Ko\'C•mher 22 ($50,000). N owmher 30 
(~100,000), and December 6 (~275,000). 
3 The pledges were 400,000 shares of American Leisure Corp. (Ortobrr 
20-shell company; Aharr" re~trirt<>d): 2.000 shares of All Stat~ Lifr Tn-
sura.nce Co. (NO\·ember 10-nonmark<'tabl<'; "rented" to f'how tlw hank 
hut not owned b~· Tri-Stat<'): :\Tn.rlin Inv<'!'tment Co. (Now·mbPr 22-
20.000 shares: "rented" from a per~on who was t<lld t lw~· would not be 
med as collaternl): Manngemrnt Dynnmics, Inc. (Deremh<'l' 6-100,000 
shnrcs; trading ~~~~pended: withdrawn ns rollateral); Geneml Tnv<'stment 
Corp. (Derember 19-175,000 ~hnrP~: rcstrirted); Sa~ellite S~·st.ems Corp. 
(.Ta.nua.ry 19--rcstrictcd and "rentrd": fictitious O\'ersctl>< nd,·prtisrment 
plnnted). 
79-1013-0PINION 
RUBIN v. UNITED STATES 3 
of one issue was suspended shortly after the pledge when the 
issuing company could not account for 900,000 shares of i~ 
stock; Tri-State replaced this collateral before Bankers Trust 
learned of the difficulty. Petitioner acted as Tri-State's agent 
for most of these transactions. 
A Justice Department request for information about Tri-
State received February 28, two days after the consolidated 
note was signed, prompted Bankers Trust on March 5 to 
demand payment in full within three days. No payment of 
this demand was made, and in May another officer of Tri-
State met with bank officials and tried to forestall foreclosure. 
After rejecting Tri-State's request for a further loan. the 
bank sued on the note. 
Bankers Trust also proceeded against petitioner personally 
as a guarantor of the loans. Petitioner signed a confession of 
judgment against himself in the amount of the unpaid loans. 
plus accrued interest. but thereafter filed a petition for bank-
ruptcy. The bank recovered only about $2.500. plus interest 
and expenses. on its $475,000 loan. 
Petitioner was indicted on three counts of violating and 
conspiring to violate various ff'deral antifraud statutes, in-
cluding § 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U. S. C'. 
§ 77q (a).~ Following a .iury trial in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York, petitioner 
"·as convicted on the conspiracy count. On appeal to tlw 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, petitionC>r raised 
• Count 1 of the indictment eharged r)('titioner and his codefendants with 
ron~piring to violnte 18 U. R. C. § 1014 (frnud in a bank loa.n applirn-
tion), 18 U. S. C. ~ 1341 (mail fraud), nnd 18 U. S. C. § 1343 (wire 
frnnd), as well ns § 17 (a) (Rrrurities fraud). Counts 2 and 3 31leged 
\ ~<ubstantive Yiolations of§ 17 (a) unci 18 U.S. C.§ 1014 against petitionrr 
n nd some of the codefendants listed in the conspiracr row1t. Proceed-
ing;'! against the petitioner werr 8cverrd before triaJ. The Govrrnmrnt. 
agreed to dismi8s the subst.a.ntiYe charge of fraud in :t bank lonn ap-
plira.tion before it rearhrd the jury, nnd the jury acquitted petitionrr of tht' 
~ub~tantive count of securities frnud. 
70-101~-0PINION 
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several grounds. including whether a pledge of stock as col-
lateral for a bank loan is an "offer or sale" under ~ 17 (a). 
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 609 F. 2d 51 (CA2 1970).r' 
We granted certiorari limited to the question whether such 
a pledge is an "offer or sale." 445 U. S. 960 (1980). 
II 
Rection 17 (a) of the Recurities Act of 1933 provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or 
sale of m1y securit?:es by usc of any means or instruments 
of transportation or communication in interstate com-
merce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
"(!) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to de-
fraud, or 
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of any 
untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to 
state a material fact ncc('ssary in order to make tlw 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made. not misleading, or 
"(3) to engage in any transaction. practice. or cour8(' 
of busi1wss which operates or would operate as a fraud 
or deceit upon the purchaser." 15 U. S. C. ~ 77q (a) 
(emphasis added). 
Petitioner do('s not deny that he engaged in a conspiracy to 
commit fraud through false representations to Tri-State con-
cerning the stocks pledged; he docs not deny that the shares 
wf're "securities" under the Act. Rather, he contends nar-
rowly that these pledges did not constitute "offers" or "sales" 
under § 17 (a) of the Act. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6.0 To sustain 
5 The Court of Appeals dividNI over an evidentiary issue. It rejected 
petitioner's argument regarding the scope of § 17 (a) without comment. 
See 609 F. 2d, at 66. 
6 The misrepref;entntions at issur in this case related to the stocks 
themselves; petitioner does not allrg:c that his conviction, insofar a.s it 
im·oh·ed securities fraud under § 17 (a), wru:; based on misrepresenta,tions 
79-1013-0PINION 
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this contention. petitioner argues that Tri-State deposited the 
stocks with the bank only as collateral security for a loan, not 
as a transfer or sale. From this he argues that the implied 
power to dispose of the stocks could ripen into title and there-
by constitute a "sale" only by effecting foreclosure of the 
various pledges, an event that could not occur without a de-
fault on the loans. 
We begin by looking to the language of § 17 (a) of the Act. 
E. g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976) .. 
The terms "offer" and "sale" in § 17 (a) are defined in § 2 ( 3) 
of the Act: 
"The term 'sale' or 'sell' shall include every contract of 
sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, 
for value. The term ... 'offer' shall include every 
attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to 
buy, a security or interest in a security, for value." 15 
U.S. C. § 77b (3) (emphasis added). 
Obtaining a loan secured by a pledge of shares of stock 
unmistakably involves a "disposition of ... [an] interest in 
a security, for value." Although pledges transfer less than 
absolute title, the interest thus transferred nonetheless is an 
"interest in a security." The pledges contemplated a self-
executing procedure under a power that could, at the option 
of the pledgee (the bank) in the event of a default, vest 
absolute title and ownership. Bankers Trust pa.rted with ~ 
substantial consideration-specifically, a total of $475,000--
\ancl obtained the inchoate but valuable interest under the 
pledges and concomitant powers. It is not essential under 
the terms of the Act that full title pass to a transferee for the 
transaction to be an "offer" or a "sale." See, e. g., United 
made about the financial condition of Tri-St~te itself. Thus, we need not. 
decide whether misrepresentations or omissions involved in a securities 
transaction but not pert.a.ining to the securities themselves can form the 
basis of a violation of § 17 (a). 
79-1013-0PINION 
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States v. Gentile, 530 F. 2d 461 , 466 (CA2) , ccrt. denied , 426 
U. S. 936 (1976). 
III 
When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous. judicial 
inquiry is complete, except "in 'rare and exceptional circum-
stances.'" Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill , 437 U. S. 
153, 187, n. 33 (1978) (quoting Crooks v. Harelson , 282 U.S. 
) 
55, 60 (1930). See Aaron v. SEC,-U.S.-, - (1980); 
Ernst & Er&t Hochfelder , supra, at 214. n. 33. No such 
circumstances are present here since our reading of the statute 
is wholly consistent with the history and the purposes of the 
Securities Act of 1933. The Uniform Sale of Securities Act. 
a model "blue sky" statute adopted in many states, defined 
"sale" in language almost identical to that now appearing in 
~ 2 (3).7 In Cecil B. De Mille Productions, Inc. v. Woolery, 
61 F. 2d 45 (CA9 1932). the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit construed this provision of the model statute as 
adopted by California and held that the definition of "salen 
embraced a pledge. Congress subsequently enacted the defi-
nition from the Uniform Act almost verbatim. ~ee Federal 
Securities Act: Hearings on H. R. 4314 before the House 
Committee on Interstate and Foreig11 Commerce . 73d Cong .. 
1st Sess .. 11 (1933). See generally id. , at 13; Securities Act: 
Hearings on S. 875 before the Renate Committee on Banking 
and Currency, 73d Cong .. 1st Sess., 71 (1933). Petitionf'r has 
cited nothing to suggest that Congress did not intend the 
broad scope that cases arising under the Uniform Act. such as 
TV oolery, supra, had given the definitions of "sale." Sec 
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575. 581 (1978). 
Treating pledges as included among "offers" and "sales" 
comports with the purpose of the Act and. specifically. with 
7 National Conference of Comrni:-!' ioncrs on l Tniform Sta te Laws, Hand-
book and Proceedings 174 (1929) (Fourth and Final Draft.) ("sale" 
drfined to "include every disposition , or attempt to dispose of a securit~­
or interest in a security for Yalue"). 
79-1013-0PINION 
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that of § 17 (a). We frequently have observed that these 
provisions were enacted to protect against fraud and promote 
the free flow of information in the public dissemination of 
securities. E. g., United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 
774 (1979); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, supra, at 195. The 
economic considerations and realities present when a lender 
parts with value and accepts securities as collateral security 
\for a loan are similar in important respect to the risk an in-
vestor undertakes when purchasing shares. Both are rely-
ing on the value of the securities themselves, and both must 
be able to depend on the representations made by the trans-
feror of the securities, regardless of whether the transferor 
passes full title or only a conditional and defeasible interest 
to secure repayment of a loan. 8 
I Petitioner would have us interpret "offer" and "sale" in a 
way that not only is cramped but conflicts with the plain 
meaning of the statute and its purpose as well. We therefore 
hold that the pledges here were "offers" or "sales" under 
~ 17 (a); accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
8 To the extent that petit.ioner argues there was no need to protect 
pledgees, the very fact that Congress saw fit to afford such protection 
I
under the Commerce Clause. U. S. Canst., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, ends our 
inquiry, absent a contention, not present here, that the Constitution other-
wise prohibits the means selected. "Our individual appra.isal of the 
wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the 
Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once 
thr meaning of aJl enactment is discerned ru1d its constitutionality 
determined, the judicial process comes to an end." Tennessee Valley 
Authority v. Hill. supra, at 194. 
January 9, 1981 
79-1013 Rubin v. United States 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
.§nprtntt cqou:rt of fltt ~b .~taft~ 
~rurlp:ttghtn. i9. <!J. 21l~JI.;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE Wo. . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
. .. 
January 9, 1981 
RE: No. 79-1013 Rubin v. United States 
Dear Chief: 
Thank you for your changes in the above. Of course, 
I am still with you. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
.§uvumt <!Jcttrt ttf tip~ ~b .~tatcsi 
'IDasfrington.}n. <If. 20.?'-1-;l I 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
January 9, 1981 
Re: No. 79-1013 - William Rubin v. United States 
Dear Chief: 




The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.:§up-rtm:t Qfomi o-f tqt ~nittb !i g 
~ltlllp:ngtctt. ~. QJ. 2ll$JI.' 
Re: No. 79-1013 - Rubin v. United States 
Dear Chief: 
January 12, 1981 
I have sent to the Print Shop a very brief concurrence along the 
lines of my remarks at Conference. It should be circulated within a 




The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
... 
CHAM BERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM \-i. REHNQUIST 
~ttp-rl'tttt ~01trl.of tltt ~nittb ~l'g 
jirur!pngtcn. IB. <q. 2ogr'!~ 
January 12, 1980 
Re: No. 79-1013 Rubin v. United States 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
0'~ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 





'"<' 1..11 """"' - ~t 




===i ~ - \\ '--< 
~ ;::ti 
~1 
'::;- :-o ...... ~ ·n 
~ 
~J b:i :;:;j 















~ ~ ::I ..... <:::: ~ t I -< .......... . ... ).....' s,._ w<::::: '~ { c::: ...._ . ~ b:i l 
U) . , J I -.............. I t--< """(\ ' 
'-........ ' :r: ~ \\ I --• v I 
~ I 
I 














:- I j 
~"' • v I 
....... ~ 
.-,_ ! I 
1: 
! 
